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Is China's Currency Regime A Countervailable Subsidy?A Legal Analysis Under the World TradeOrganization's SCM Agreement

机译:中国的货币制度是可以反补贴的吗?根据世界贸易组织(WTO)的SCM协议进行的法律分析

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Members of Congress are currently threatening to enact legislation authorizing the US Department of Commerce to investigate China's allegedly undervalued currency as a countervailable subsidy. If this happens, then China will very likely challenge the United States at the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) dispute settlement mechanism. This paper analyses whether a countervailing duty (CVD) applied to China's currency regime would be consistent with the WTO's Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Contrary to many commentaries, this paper concludes that, while there are several significant potential obstacles, there are in fact legitimate arguments that a WTO panel could use to uphold a US-imposed CVD on China's undervalued currency.
机译:国会议员目前威胁要颁布立法,授权美国商务部对据称中国被低估的货币进行调查,以作为可反补贴的补贴。如果发生这种情况,那么中国很可能会在世界贸易组织(WTO)的争端解决机制中挑战美国。本文分析了适用于中国货币制度的反补贴税(CVD)是否与WTO的《补贴与反补贴措施(SCM)协议》一致。与许多评论相反,本文得出的结论是,尽管存在若干重大潜在障碍,但实际上存在合理的论据,即WTO专家组可以用来维持美国对中国被低估的货币施加的CVD。

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