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Strictly limited choice or agency? Institutional duality, legitimacy, and subsidiaries' political strategies

机译:严格限制选择或代理?制度二重性,合法性和子公司的政治策略

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This article analyzes political strategies of MNC subsidiaries in emerging markets. We find that institutional pressures from public and private non-market actors in the emerging market lead to increased political activism. Furthermore, we find that these relationships become stronger, when the external pressures are joined by strong firm-internal pressures. Our findings contribute to the scarce literature on firms' political strategies in emerging markets. They also support recent criticism of institutional theory's strong focus on isomorphism as the most important legitimacy-conveying mechanism. We argue that the isomorphism-based either-or logic gives way to stronger agency of the subsidiary and to a logic of active negotiation and social construction of the subsidiary's legitimacy in the emerging market. Our findings show support for this idea as political activism is one such way how the subsidiary's legitimacy can be built and nurtured. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:本文分析了跨国公司在新兴市场中的子公司的政治策略。我们发现,新兴市场中来自公共和私人非市场参与者的机构压力导致政治行动主义加剧。此外,我们发现,当外部压力与强大的公司内部压力相结合时,这些关系会变得更牢固。我们的发现促成了关于新兴市场公司政治策略的稀有文献。他们还支持最近对制度理论对同构作为最重要的合法性传达机制的强烈关注的批评。我们认为,基于同构的“或”逻辑让位于子公司更强大的代理机构,以及积极协商和子公司在新兴市场中合法性社会建设的逻辑。我们的研究结果表明了对这一想法的支持,因为政治行动主义是可以建立和培养子公司合法性的一种方式。 (C)2014 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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