Stephen Biddle on Military Power

摘要

Military Power's argument is straightforward enough: victory and defeat in warfare have, since 1900, resulted from mastery of what the author calls 'the modern system' of tactics, the essence of which is (in the offense) 'cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression and combined arms integration' (p.35) and (in the defense) a similarly complex use of ground, deep positions, reserves and counterattack (pp.44-8). These techniques, mastered by a small number of countries, explain why and how countries win wars. In this clear, deeply researched and powerfully argued book, Stephen Biddle says that it is this system, and not technological superiority, or some generalized dominance of offensive or defensive weapons, or sheer numbers that determines combat outcomes. He argues his case by providing an account of warfare since the end of the nineteenth century, and by a close rendering of three campaigns: the German 'Michael' offensive of the spring of 1918, the British 'Goodwood' offensive in Normandy in 1944 and 'Desert Storm', the American attack on Iraq in 1991. In addition, Biddle makes his case using a large-n study drawing on a number of sources, including the Correlates of War project, as well as findings from simulations, and in particular from the Institute for Defense Analyses' recreation of a fight at 73 Easting during the 1991 Gulf War. The book concludes with a critique of the notion of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Technology has not and will not change warfare dramatically for some time to come, Biddle believes. He offers as well a critique of international relations theorists who speak of military capability as an undifferentiated phenomenon, rather than a complex of forces and their doctrines.