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Disability benefit generosity and labor force withdrawal

机译:伤残补助金慷慨和撤离劳动力

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A key component for estimating the optimal size and structure of disability insurance (DI) programs is the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity. Yet, in many countries, including the United States, all workers face identical benefit schedules, which are a function of one's labor market history, making it difficult to separate the effect of the benefit level from the effect of unobserved preferences for work on individuals' claiming decisions. To circumvent this problem, we exploit exogenous variation in DI benefits in Austria arising from several reforms to its DI and old age pension system in the 1990s and 2000s. We use comprehensive administrative social security records data on the universe of Austrian workers to compute benefit levels under six different regimes, allowing us to identify and precisely estimate the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity. We find that, over this time period, a 1% increase in potential DI benefits was associated with a 1.2% increase in DI claiming. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:估计残障保险(DI)计划的最佳规模和结构的关键要素是DI主张相对于福利慷慨的弹性。然而,在包括美国在内的许多国家中,所有工人都面临着相同的福利计划,这是一个人的劳动力市场历史的函数,这使得难以将福利水平的影响与未观察到的工作偏好对个人的影响分开来。主张决定。为了解决这个问题,我们利用了1990年代和2000年代奥地利对其直接投资和老年退休金制度进行的几次改革而产生的直接投资福利的外在变化。我们使用奥地利工人整体上的综合行政社会保障记录数据来计算六种不同制度下的福利水平,从而使我们能够识别并准确地估计DI主张相对于福利慷慨的弹性。我们发现,在这段时间内,潜在的直接投资收益增加1%与直接投资要求增加1.2%有关。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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