Richard Brown and Paula Brown v First Secretary of State and Chelmsford Local Planning Authority

摘要

During the summer of 1998 the Appellants erected on land known as Paradise Lost, Meadow Land, Runwell, Essex an "L-shaped combination of two mobile homes". The two homes were brought to the site separately and they were then bolted together. Sections of internal walls were removed to allow access and to permit the structure as a whole to be used as a residence. This structure was attached to a brick foundation and was connected to services such as electricity, water and sanitation. It had no wheels and could not be dismantled without causing its disintegration. The Appellants used the edifice so constructed as their family home since that time. Since the summer of 1998 works were carried out to the structure and in respect of one of the mobile homes, over the years, its fabric was largely replaced. At some point after October 1, 2001 the Appellants added wooden cladding to the exterior of the conjoined structure. Chelmsford Borough Council ("the Council") issued enforcement notices on September 19, 2002 identifying the change of use of the land to use as a caravan site. The Appellants appealed against the notices. The appeal against the enforcement notices was based upon s. 174(2)(d) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act) namely on the basis that, at the date of the issue of the notice, (September 19, 2002), no enforcement action could be taken in respect of any breach of planning control constituted by the matters stated in the notice. The Appellants submitted that any breach of control consisted in the carrying out without permission of building or other operations on the land and was not subject to enforcement action because the operations were substantially completed over four years before the issue of the notice. The appeal was dismissed by an Inspector's decision in June 2002. That decision was appealed by the Appellants on two grounds (1) that the Inspector misapplied the test formulated in the decision in Sage v Secretary of State and/or failed to set out proper reasons for that conclusion and (2) that the Inspector failed to set out a reasoned conclusion as to whether the erection of the building and the addition of cladding to it and/or repair works were separate building operations and should be treated separately.