Moral sensitivity has generally been interpreted in a normative sense, as the ability to notice moral features present in a situation. This paper outlines an alternative, descriptive conception of moral sensitivity: the levels of moralisation model. This model describes four qualitatively distinct levels at which a preference can be held: no moralisation; moralisation for the self; moralisation for others; and public expression of moralisation. Empirical research supporting the existence of these levels as well as processes that move a preference across the levels are discussed. In addition, the practical utility of the model is demonstrated with regard to moral education and conflict resolution programs.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057241003754914
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