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PEPs – let's get serious

机译:PEP –让我们认真一点

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摘要

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to draw attention to some options for better management of politically exposed persons (PEPs). Second, to draw attention to the problems experienced by low-capacity entities in implementing a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering (AML) counter financing of terrorism (CTF). Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on the experience of the author in working with low-capacity reporting entities in Australia and the Pacific to assist them in the implementation of AML/CTF risk-based programs. Findings – There are four initiatives worthy of consideration by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in their current revision work that would improve management of PEPs and other AML/CTF risks: extension of the FATF requirement 33 to bring government agencies that incorporate companies within recommendations 5-16, in effect expanding the concept of “customer”; extension of the FATF requirement 34 to bring government agencies that register trusts within recommendations 5-16, also in effect expanding the concept of “customer”; extension of Special Recommendation VIII to require reporting of all inbound and outbound electronic financial transactions above set thresholds; and introducing a two-tier AML/CTF regime to assist low-capacity entities. Research limitations/implications – This paper is based on observations derived from working alongside low-capacity entities in Australia and the Pacific. Practical implications – This includes expansion of the FATF recommendations to new sectors and adoption of a two-tier AML/CTF system instead of the single risk-based system. Originality/value – FATF and policymakers should consider the significant value that can be obtained by extension of the FATF recommendations as suggested in closing systemic weaknesses, reducing the overall cost of AML/CTF regimes and improving their efficacy. The paper draws on the current experience of new regulated entities not previously exposed to AML/CTF requirements. Regulators implementing risk-based regimes should consider the issues experienced by low-capacity entities when measuring the likely success of risk-based regimes. See similar recommendations made regarding companies and trusts by Transparency International in their March 2009 paper “Undue diligence.”
机译:目的–本文的目的是双重的。首先,提请人们注意更好地管理政治人物的一些选择。第二,提请注意低容量实体在实施基于风险的反洗钱(AML)反恐融资(CTF)方法时遇到的问题。设计/方法/方法–本文借鉴作者与澳大利亚和太平洋地区低容量报告实体合作以协助他们实施AML / CTF基于风险的计划的经验。调查结果–金融行动工作组(FATF)在其当前的修订工作中有四项举措值得考虑,这些举措将改善对PEP和其他AML / CTF风险的管理:扩展FATF要求33,以将纳入公司的政府机构纳入建议范围5-16,实际上扩展了“客户”的概念;扩大了FATF要求34,以将注册信托的政府机构纳入建议5-16的范围内,实际上也扩大了“客户”的概念;扩展特别建议VIII,要求报告所有超过设定阈值的入站和出站电子金融交易;并引入了两层反洗钱/反恐怖融资机制,以协助低能力实体。研究的局限性/意义–本文基于与澳大利亚和太平洋地区的低产能企业合作而得出的观察结果。实际意义–这包括将FATF建议扩展到新领域,并采用两层AML / CTF系统而不是基于单一风险的系统。原创性/价值–金融行动特别工作组和政策制定者应考虑通过扩大金融行动特别工作组的建议来获得可观的价值,如在解决系统性缺陷,减少反洗钱/反恐恐怖主义制度的总体成本以及提高其效力方面所建议的那样。本文借鉴了以前未受到AML / CTF要求的新受监管实体的当前经验。实施基于风险的制度的监管机构在评估基于风险的制度的可能成功时,应考虑低能力实体所遇到的问题。请参阅透明国际在2009年3月发表的论文“尽职调查”中针对公司和信托提出的类似建议。

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