REALPOLITIK, PUNISHMENT AND CONTROL: THUCYDIDES ON THE MORALIZATION OF CONFLICT

摘要

The pages of Thucydides show us many expressions of what one might call the amoral doctrine in international politics, namely, that politics between political communities are not properly subject to ethical evaluation. This article traces Thucydides' understated critique of this idea. I first show that concerns about transgression and punishment inexorably influence political action. Moreover, Thucydides suggests a connection between the aspirations of realpolitik and the desire of the political community to preserve the freedom to effect justice and not subordinate its will to the dictates of necessity - especially necessities imposed by other political bodies. I then describe Thucydides' explanation for why political communities persist in regarding themselves primarily as moral agents rather than security-maximizers. I finally describe what Thucydides regards to be a more genuine realism. This truer realism maintains the possibility of constrained moral choice while still engendering a prudent pessimism about controlling human affairs. In the end, Thucydides, while sharing in much of the realist tradition's moral skepticism, disagrees with its frequent subsequent focus on the theoretically unlimited acquisition of power.