Regulating balance sheet audit: A game theoretical analysis

摘要

The decision situation implicit to balance sheet audit is modelled as a game theoretical model and examined for its behavioural implications. Possible types of decisions are identified as Nash equilibria. The basic game model is characterized by an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Its properties are discussed in detail with respect to alternative scenarios of statutory audit. The regulatory propositions of separation between audit and consulting, on the one hand, and the rotation of auditors, on the other, are analyzed in the context of the game. It turns out that these measures may have contradictory effects on the quality of the balance sheet audit and it depends on the specification of regulatory details and the reaction of the agents whether the one or the other effect dominates in the end. Another proposition to enhance the audit performance is the extension of the liability of statutory auditors. Prerequisites for the success of this measure are that either no professional liability insurance exists or that, if otherwise, deductibles are calculated as a fixed percentage of the loss. The examples refer to German legal rules, however, similar legal rules are valid for most of the developed market economies.