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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Investment Compliance >Revisiting insider trading in the debt markets: lessons for debt investors and members of committees in bankruptcy cases
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Revisiting insider trading in the debt markets: lessons for debt investors and members of committees in bankruptcy cases

机译:重新审视债务市场的内幕交易:为破产案件中的债务投资者和委员会成员提供的经验教训

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摘要

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) insider trading principles as they apply to trading in debt securities based on the Commission's recent settlement with Barclays Bank. Design/methodology/approach – The paper describes the SEC's complaint that Barclays purchased and sold securities while it was aware of material nonpublic information and discusses the implications of the resulting settlement and lessons that should be learned, including a warning for members of committees in bankruptcy cases, the critical significance of receiving material information under a confidentiality agreement, the uncertain legal standing of so-called “big boy” letters, and the importance of “information barriers” being demonstrably effective. Findings – While the law of insider trading was developed predominantly in the equity markets, the Settlement demonstrates that the SEC remains committed to exporting its insider trading principles to the markets for other securities. Practical implications – Every financial institution should be aware of when a part of its organization is receiving material, non-public information from a public company, restrict trading while the firm is aware of this information, or alternatively maintain and document procedures that separate that information from individuals who are making investment decisions, and develop systems to ensure compliance with applicable bankruptcy laws, Orginality/value – The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.
机译:目的–本文的目的是提请注意证券交易委员会(SEC)的内幕交易原则,因为这些原则适用于根据该委员会最近与巴克莱银行达成的和解进行的债务证券交易。设计/方法/方法-本文描述了SEC抱怨巴克莱在了解重要的非公开信息的同时买卖证券的问题,并讨论了由此产生的和解和应汲取的教训的含义,包括警告破产委员会成员案例,根据保密协议接收重要信息的关键意义,所谓的“大男孩”信件的法律地位不明确以及“信息壁垒”的有效性非常明显。调查结果–尽管内幕交易法主要是在股票市场上制定的,但《和解》表明,SEC仍致力于将其内幕交易原则出口到其他证券的市场。实际影响–每个金融机构都应了解其组织的一部分何时从上市公司收到重要的非公开信息,在公司知道该信息时限制交易,或者选择维护和记录将这些信息分开的程序来自做出投资决策的个人,并开发系统以确保遵守适用的破产法(原始性/价值)–本文提供了经验丰富的证券律师的实用指南。

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