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Exchange rate regimes in a liquidity trap

机译:流动性陷阱中的汇率制度

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Using several specifications of a two-sector two-country DSGE model, this paper studies the performance of alternative exchange rate regimes in a liquidity trap caused by a large deflationary shock that pushes the nominal interest rate to its lower bound. We show that, contrary to common belief during the recent Euro crisis, the currency union can outperform the independent floating regime in dealing with the duration and depth of a liquidity trap. Although the welfare effects of the liquidity trap are conditional upon assumptions regarding export price setting and financial market structures, we find that the currency union welfare-dominates the independent floating for a plausible model with local currency pricing and incomplete asset markets. Targeting the exchange rate as a monetary policy rule allows for an independent policy to outperform the monetary union, highlighting the role of the exchange rate regime choice as a preventive strategy to address the adverse effects of deflationary and recessionary shocks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:本文使用两部门两国DSGE模型的几种规范,研究了由通货紧缩冲击将名义利率推低至下限所导致的流动性陷阱中替代汇率制度的表现。我们证明,与最近的欧元危机期间的普遍看法相反,货币联盟在处理流动性陷阱的持续时间和深度方面可以胜过独立的浮动制度。尽管流动性陷阱的福利效应取决于有关出口价格设定和金融市场结构的假设,但我们发现,货币联盟的福利主导着采用本地货币定价和不完整资产市场的合理模型的独立浮动。将汇率作为货币政策规则的目标是允许独立的政策胜过货币联盟,这突出显示了汇率制度选择作为预防通货紧缩和经济衰退冲击的预防策略的作用。 (C)2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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