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A Transaction Utility Approach for Bidding in Second-Price Auctions

机译:一种用于第二价拍卖的交易实用程序方法

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摘要

In both the Vickrey and eBay auctions, bidding the reservation price is the optimal strategy within the conventional utility framework. However, in practice, buyers tend to bid less than their reservation prices, and bid multiple times, thus increase their bids, in the course of an auction. In this paper, we show that both underbidding and multiple bidding behaviors can be consistent with utility maximization, if buyer's utility incorporates a transaction utility (reference price dependent) component. Transaction utility is based on the difference between the buyer's reference price and actual price paid; it captures the perceived value of the deal. More specifically, we show that the optimal bid is lower than the reservation price, but higher than the reference price. Furthermore, buyer may re-bid (above the prior optimal level) if the reference price is revised upon observing a higher current price. (C) 2019 Direct Marketing Educational Foundation, Inc. dba Marketing EDGE. All rights reserved.
机译:在维克瑞(Vickrey)拍卖和eBay拍卖中,竞标保留价都是传统公用事业框架内的最佳策略。但是,实际上,买家往往会以低于其保留价格的价格出价,并多次出价,从而在拍卖过程中提高了出价。在本文中,我们表明,如果买方的公用事业包含交易公用事业(取决于参考价格)组件,则竞价不足和多种投标行为都可以与公用事业最大化相一致。交易效用是基于买方的参考价与实际支付的价之间的差额;它捕获了交易的感知价值。更具体地说,我们显示最佳出价低于预定价格,但高于参考价格。此外,如果参考价在观察到更高的当前价格时被修改,则买方可以重新出价(高于先前的最佳水平)。 (C)2019直销教育基金会,dba Marketing EDGE。版权所有。

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