COORDINATION OF VMI SUPPLY CHAIN WITH A LOSS-AVERSE MANUFACTURER UNDER QUALITY-DEPENDENCY AND MARKETING-DEPENDENCY

摘要

This paper addresses a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain with a loss-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. Market demand faced by the retailer is stochastic and dependent on product quality level and marketing effort level. We propose a combined contract composed of option and cost-sharing to investigate coordination and profit allocation issues of the supply chain. To model loss aversion of the manufacturer, we employ multiple mental accounts and apply the utility function to upside and downside potentials of manufacturer's production decision separately. We derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is proved that both coordination of the supply chain and Pareto-improvement can be achieved synchronously by the combined contract. In the premise of coordination, the system-wide profit can be allocated arbitrarily only by option price. Through negotiation, the retailer and the manufacturer just need to confirm an appropriate option price to obtain that neither of them becomes worse off. We also find that the manufacturer's loss aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation, and the manufacturer could benefit from its own loss aversion behavior under certain condition.