This paper explores the major negotiation initiatives undertaken during the early âTroublesâ, at the height of Britain's counter-insurgency campaign between 1972 and 1976. It analyses the first significant talks undertaken, namely the âWhitelaw talksâ of July 1972, marking the beginning of a tendency towards secret dialogue, permitted again during the clergy-led talks at Feakle in December 1974. Clandestine subtlety characterised the establishment of other backchannels, some undertaken with the knowledge of the political and intelligence communities (such as those developed by chief Secret Intelligence Service officer in Northern Ireland, Michael Oatley), and others that were unsanctioned and individually forged (for instance by retired General Sir John Hackett). Taking these initiatives holistically we can build a picture of both official and unofficial efforts to bring an end to violence in Northern Ireland, particularly given the brief ceasefires that were resultant of both the Whitelaw and Feakle talks. These efforts in the early 1970s belie later political espousals that âwe don't talk to terrorists'. They will be posited as central to our understanding of the British approach to countering republican violence in the early âTroublesâ, shifting away from the traditional focus on military aspects.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.615604
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