Detecting Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Using Inertial Sensing of Aircraft Disturbance

摘要

Vulnerability of Global Navigation Satellite System users to signal spoofing is a critical threat to positioning integrity, especially in aviation applications where the consequences are potentially catastrophic. Spoofing may even become a more serious risk to aviation in the near future with the rollout of the Global Navigation Satellite System-based next-generation air traffic control system and the corresponding reduction in reliance on ground-based radar systems by air traffic control. In this work, it was shown that, for an aircraft equipped with an inertial navigation system, the vehicle dynamic response to wind gusts provides an advantage in detecting a spoofing attack. The reason is that the aircraft's response to a gust will be instantaneously reflected in inertial navigation system measurements but not in the spoofed Global Navigation Satellite System signal. The main contribution of this work is the development of a rigorous methodology to compute upper bounds on the integrity risk resulting from a worst-case spoofing attack, without needing to simulate individual aircraft approaches with an unmanageably large number specific gust disturbance profiles. A Boeing 747 aircraft model is used to demonstrate the performance of the inertial navigation system monitor under worst-case Global Navigation Satellite System spoofing and to investigate gust intensity levels that are sufficient to meet integrity risk requirements for precision approach and landing.