On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity

摘要

AbstractWe consider a model of pay-as-clear electricity market based on a Equilibrium Problem with Complementarity Constraints approach where the producers are playing a noncooperative game parameterized by the decisions of regulator of the market (ISO). In the proposed approach the bids are assumed to be convex quadratic functions of the production quantity. The demand is endogenously determined. The ISO problem aims to maximize the total welfare of the market. The demand being elastic, this total welfare take into account at the same time the willingness to pay of the aggregated consumer, as well as the cost of transactions. The market clearing will determine the market price in a pay-as-clear way. An explicit formula for the optimal solution of the ISO problem is obtained and the optimal price is proved to be unique. We also state some conditions for the existence of equilibria for this electricity market with elastic demand. Some numerical experiments on a simplified market model are also provided.