Research on the evolutionary game of environmental pollution in system dynamics model

摘要

Environmental pollution abatement is a complex project. A system dynamicsn(SD) model is built for studying a mixed-strategy evolutionary game between thengovernment that manages environmental pollution and the firm that generatesncontamination during their production processes. The stability analysis and SDnsimulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist with anstatic penalty. Therefore, a dynamic penalty is suggested in the SD model fornequilibrium stabilisation and improvement in environmental pollution.nFurthermore, a restraining penalty is found, which can not only stabilise thenevolutional processes but also ideally influence the environmental pollutionncontrol in the simulation result. The stability analysis of the evolutionary gamenwith both the dynamic penalties proves that Nash equilibrium takes the role ofnEE. The SD model can connect the static concept with dynamic predictions in thenevolutionary game theory in a visual and convenient way.