...
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Emerging Market Finance >Emerging Market Bidder Returns and the Choice of Payment Method in Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from India
【24h】

Emerging Market Bidder Returns and the Choice of Payment Method in Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from India

机译:新兴市场竞买人收益和并购中付款方式的选择:来自印度的证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       

摘要

Consistent with other evidence on short-run effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements on acquiring firm’s shareholder wealth in emerging markets, our study reveals that M&A deals in India, irrespective of the payment method, are not value destroying. Cash deals and stock deals create shareholder wealth on deal announcements. We offer ‘pseudo-cash deal hypothesis’ to explain this phenomenon. We also observe that bigger the relative size of the deal, greater is the abnormal return on deal announcements. We observe that acquirers with high promoter holdings are highly reluctant to offer stock when they acquire a majority stake. However, bigger deals, deals for listed target firms, and deals in the information technology sector, command stock offers. JEL Classification: G34, G14.
机译:与其他有关并购公告对新兴市场中收购公司股东财富的短期影响的证据一致,我们的研究表明,印度的并购交易,无论采用何种支付方式,都不会破坏价值。现金交易和股票交易在交易公告上创造股东财富。我们提供“伪现金交易假说”来解释这种现象。我们还观察到,交易的相对规模越大,交易公告的异常收益就越大。我们观察到,拥有较高发起人持股的收购方在收购多数股权时极不愿发行股票。但是,更大的交易,针对上市目标公司的交易以及信息技术领域的交易,都吸引着股票报价。 JEL分类:G34,G14。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号