OLIGOPOLY GAMES AND THE COURNOT-BERTRAND MODEL: A SURVEY

摘要

Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot-Bertrand model. When the choice of strategic variable is endogenous, the established dominant strategy is output competition. A growing body of work demonstrates, however, that the Cournot-Bertrand outcome can be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries. Observations of real-world markets consistent with Cournot-Bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications. We lay out the roots of the Cournot-Bertrand model and explore a number of model developments. We categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions. In particular, some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous. Altogether, this research identifies when Cournot-Bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions. We also review the Cournot-Bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics, industrial organization, labor, and public economics. We expect the literature to continue to expand in the future.