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The Trouble with Stock Options

机译:股票期权的麻烦

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The most pronounced change in corporate compensation practices over the past decade is the escalation and recent decline in executive and employee stock options. In 1992, firms in the Standard & Poor's 500 granted their employees options worth a total of $11 billion at the time of grant; by 2000, option grants in S&P 500 firms increased to $119 billion. In 2002, option grants in the S&P 500 fell to $71 billion, well below their peak, but still a six-fold increase from a decade earlier. Despite―or perhaps because of―their growing importance, employee stock options have become increasingly controversial. The main argument in favor of stock option plans is that they give executives a greater incentive to act in the interests of shareholders by providing a direct link between realized compensation and company stock price performance. In addition, offering employee stock options in lieu of cash compensation allows companies to attract highly motivated and entrepreneurial employees and also lets companies obtain employment services without (directly) expending cash. Options are typically structured so that only employees who remain with the firm can benefit from them, thus also providing retention incentives. Finally, stock options encourage executive risk taking, which can mitigate problems with executive risk aversion. But the incentives provided by stock options have also been criticized. The recent accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and other companics have been linked to excessive risk taking and an excessive fixation on stock prices, both allegedly caused by the escalation in option grants (Cassidy, 2002; Madrick, 2003). Moreover, these scandals have focused attention on problems with current accounting practices, which in turn has opened a debate on the accounting treatment of employee stock options. Under current U.S. accounting rules, companies generally do not treat options as an expense on company financial statements. Proponents of expensing options argue that expensing will generate more informative financial statements and improve the credibility of reported earnings. Opponents of expensing worry that expensing will cause companies to grant fewer options, especially to lower-level employees, which in turn will "destroy the engine that fueled the economic growth" of the 1990s.
机译:在过去十年中,企业薪酬实践中最明显的变化是高管和雇员认股权的升级以及最近的下降。 1992年,标准普尔500指数中的公司向员工授予了价值110亿美元的期权。到2000年,标准普尔500强公司的期权赠款增加到1,190亿美元。 2002年,标准普尔500指数中的期权赠款下降至710亿美元,远低于其峰值,但仍比十年前增长了六倍。尽管(或者可能由于)它们的重要性日益提高,但员工认股权却引起了越来越多的争议。支持股票期权计划的主要论点是,通过提供已实现的薪酬与公司股票价格表现之间的直接联系,它们可以使高管们有更大的动机为股东利益采取行动。此外,提供员工股票期权代替现金补偿可以使公司吸引有上进心和企业家精神的员工,还可以使公司获得就业服务而无需(直接)花费现金。期权通常具有结构性,因此只有留在公司的员工才能从​​中受益,因此也提供了留用激励措施。最后,股票期权鼓励高管承担风险,这可以减轻高管规避风险的问题。但是,股票期权提供的激励机制也受到了批评。最近在安然公司,世通公司,环球电讯公司和其他公司发生的会计丑闻与过度冒险和股票价格过度固定有关,据称这两者都是由于期权赠款的增加而引起的(Cassidy,2002; Madrick,2003)。此外,这些丑闻将注意力集中在当前会计惯例的问题上,这反过来又引发了有关雇员股票期权的会计处理的辩论。根据当前的美国会计准则,公司通常不会将期权视为公司财务报表的费用。支持费用选择的人认为,费用将产生更多的信息,并提高报告收益的可信度。反对费用的人担心,费用会导致公司授予较少的选择权,特别是对低级员工,这反过来会“破坏1990年代推动经济增长的引擎”。

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