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What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules

机译:泰勒规则有什么问题?通过定位规则在货币政策中使用判断

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This paper starts from the observation that most recent research on monetary-policy rules is restricted to consider a commitment to a simple instrument rule, where the central-bank instrument is a simple function of available information about the economy, like the Taylor rule. Alternatively, as proposed by Taylor, for instance, in (1993, 2000), the proposed simple instrument rules are only to be used as "guidelines" and deviations from the rules are sometimes called for. The paper argues that a commitment to a simple instrument rule is inadequate as a description of current monetary policy, especially inflation targeting. Furthermore, it argues that the proposal to use simple instrument rules as mere guidelines is incomplete and too vague to be operational. First, monetary-policy reform in the last two decades is better described as the formulation of clear objectives for monetary policy and the creation of institutional commitment to those objectives. Second, inflation-targeting central banks have developed elaborate decision-making processes, in which huge amounts of data are collected and processed, conditional inflation- and output-gap forecasts are constructed with the exercise of considerable judgment and extra-model information, and an instrument decision is reached with the help of those forecasts. This process can to a large extent be seen as inflation-forecast targeting, setting the instrument so that the cor- responding conditional inflation forecast, conditional on all relevant information and judgment, is consistent with the inflation target and the output-gap forecast not indicating too much output-gap variability. Third, no central bank has made an explicit commitment to a simple instrument rule. Instead, some prominent current and former central bankers seem highly skeptical about the idea. Neither has any central bank announced that a particular simple instrument rule is used as a guideline. Fourth, the proposal to use instrument rules as guidelines is incomplete and too vague to be operational, since it does not provide any rules for when deviations from the rule are appropriate.
机译:本文从这样的观察开始,即最近对货币政策规则的研究仅限于考虑对简单工具规则的承​​诺,其中中央银行工具是像泰勒规则那样的有关经济的可用信息的简单函数。另外,例如泰勒(Taylor)在(1993,2000)中提出的建议,所提出的简单工具规则仅用作“准则”,有时需要偏离规则。该论文认为,对简单工具规则的承​​诺不足以描述当前的货币政策,尤其是针对通胀目标。此外,它认为,将简单的工具规则仅用作准则的建议是不完整的,而且太模糊而无法实施。首先,过去二十年中的货币政策改革被更好地描述为制定明确的货币政策目标并为这些目标建立机构承诺。其次,以通货膨胀为目标的中央银行制定了详尽的决策程序,其中收集并处理了大量数据,通过运用大量的判断力和额外的模型信息来构造有条件的通货膨胀和产出缺口预测,在这些预测的帮助下可以确定仪器的决策。该过程在很大程度上可以看作是通货膨胀预测目标,其设置工具应使以所有相关信息和判断为条件的相应的有条件通货膨胀预测与通货膨胀目标一致,而产出缺口预测并不表明输出差距的可变性太大。第三,没有中央银行对简单的工具规则做出明确承诺。相反,一些著名的现任和前任中央银行行长对这一想法持高度怀疑的态度。中央银行也没有宣布将特定的简单工具规则用作指导。第四,使用工具规则作为指导的建议是不完整的,而且太含糊,无法实施,因为它没有提供任何关于何时适当偏离规则的规则。

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