Efficient Selective Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles

摘要

We construct two efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems that admit selective-identity security reductions without random oracles in groups equipped with a bilinear map. Selective-identity secure IBE is a slightly weaker security model than the standard security model for IBE. In this model the adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity that it intends to attack, whereas in an adaptive-identity attack the adversary is allowed to choose this identity adaptively. Our first system-BB_1-is based on the well studied decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, and extends naturally to systems with hierarchical identities, or HIBE. Our second system-BB_2-is based on a stronger assumption which we call the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption and provides another approach to building IBE systems. Our first system, BB_1, is very versatile and well suited for practical applications: the basic hierarchical construction can be efficiently secured against chosen-ciphertext attacks, and further extended to support efficient non-interactive threshold decryption, among others, all without using random oracles. Both systems, BB_1 and BB_2, can be modified genetically to provide "full" IBE security (i.e., against adaptive-identity attacks), either using random oracles, or in the standard model at the expense of a non-polynomial but easy-to-compensate security reduction.