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Optimal strategy for enterprises' green technology innovation from the perspective of political competition

机译:政治竞争视角下企业绿色技术创新的最优策略

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Different local governments engage in strategic interactions when they compete for resources to promote regional economic development under the background of 'political tournaments'. Although many scholars have studied the impact of political competition among local governments on the environmental governance effect, they have paid less attention to the internal mechanism of the environmental benefits arising from political competition. Under the two scenarios of considering and not considering political competition, this paper uses Stackelberg game theory and optimization theory to analyse enterprises' optimal green technology innovation strategies. In addition, the impact of key factors is analysed based on the decision-making modes of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing, without cost-sharing and revenue-sharing, and centralized decision-making. This paper draws the following main conclusions: (1) Considering the influence of political competition, the optimal green technology innovation strategies of local governments and enterprises differ for different modes. (2) Political competition not only directly affects enterprises' optimal level of green technology innovation but also indirectly affects it by influencing the optimal investment ratio of environmental governance. The inverted U-shaped relationship between political competition and enterprises' optimal level of green technology innovation is related to the incentive coefficient of local government investment behaviour set by the central government. Controlling for the relative size of the incentive coefficient of local government investment in environmental governance and economic development can promote the positive impact of political competition on enterprises' optimal level of green technology innovation. (3) The decision-making mode of enterprises and local governments and environmental decentralization have significant effects on the optimal level of green technology innovation, which should be considered when the central government formulates effective environmental policies. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:当他们竞争资源以促进“政治锦标赛背景”的建议时,不同的地方政府在争夺资源时互动。虽然许多学者研究了政治竞争对地方政府对环境治理效应的影响,但他们对政治竞争引起的环境效益的内部机制不太关注。在考虑而不是考虑政治竞争的两种情况下,本文采用Stackelberg博弈论和优化理论来分析企业最优绿色技术创新策略。此外,根据成本分享和收入共享的决策方式分析关键因素的影响,没有成本分享和收入共享,以及集中式决策。本文提出以下主要结论:(1)考虑到政治竞争的影响,地方政府和企业的最佳绿色技术创新策略对不同的模式不同。 (2)政治竞争不仅直接影响企业的最佳绿色技术创新水平,而且通过影响环境治理的最佳投资比率间接影响它。政治竞争与企业最佳绿色技术创新水平之间的倒立的U形关系与中央政府设定的地方政府投资行为的激励系数有关。控制环境治理和经济发展的当地政府投资激励系数的相对规模可以促进政治竞争对企业最佳绿色技术创新水平的积极影响。 (3)企业和地方政府和环境权力下放的决策模式对绿色技术创新的最佳水平具有显着影响,当中央政府制定有效的环境政策时应考虑。 (c)2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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