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A hybrid circular economy - Game theoretical approach in a dual-channel green supply chain considering sale's effort, delivery time, and hybrid remanufacturing

机译:混合循环经济-考虑销售力度,交货时间和混合再制造的双通道绿色供应链中的博弈论方法

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The circular economy (CE) and the marketing activities are the key subjects to attract the market share in today's complex supply chain. Here, dual selling channels, the online delivery time, and the distributor sales effort are considered as marketing activities to attract the customers. Moreover, in order to meets the economic and environmental principles of the CE, three responsibilities to ease the carbon emission, as approaches for the return on investment, are devised, including investment in the green production, the cap and trade regulation, and the hybrid remanufacturing via both the manufacturer and the distributor under the technology license. This such complex supply chain needs to determine the equilibrium amounts of the distinguishing elements, including the pricing strategy, remanufacturing approaches, delivery time, and sales effort to abate the conflicts between the members, and consequently, to enhance the economic and CE objectives of the supply chain (SC). In order to obtain the equilibrium decision makings, three game theoretical approaches, including the manufacturer-Stackelberg game (SM), the distributor-Stackelberg game (SR) and the Nash game (N) are employed. The interaction between the game sequences and the remanufacturing process is the key purpose of this paper to not only maximize the profit of SC but also to enrich the CE and marketing goals of this research. The outcomes presented that the SM game, where the manufacturer remanufactures most of the defected products which are collected via the distributor, is the best game strategy to improve the profits of both the distributor and the manufacturer, and also to enhance the other distinguishing elements. In addition, in the SR game, when most of the returns remanufacture via the distributor under the manufacturer license, it not only maximizes the profits of members but also lead to the improvement of the distinguishing elements. In the Nash game, however, there is a conflict between the members about the remanufacturing process, which reduces the SC profit in this game as compared to other ones. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:循环经济(CE)和营销活动是在当今复杂的供应链中吸引市场份额的关键主题。在这里,双重销售渠道,在线交货时间和分销商的销售努力被视为吸引顾客的营销活动。此外,为了符合行政长官的经济和环境原则,设计了三项减轻碳排放的职责,作为投资回报的方法,包括对绿色生产的投资,总量控制和贸易法规以及混合动力。根据技术许可,通过制造商和分销商进行再制造。这种复杂的供应链需要确定区别要素的均衡数量,包括定价策略,再制造方法,交货时间和销售工作,以减轻成员之间的冲突,从而提高企业的经济和CE目标。供应链(SC)。为了获得均衡决策,采用了三种博弈理论方法,包括制造商-Stackelberg博弈(SM),分销商-Stackelberg博弈(SR)和纳什博弈(N)。博弈序列与再制造过程之间的相互作用是本文的主要目的,不仅要最大化SC的利润,而且要丰富本研究的CE和营销目标。结果表明,SM游戏是制造商重新制造通过分销商收集的大部分缺陷产品的最佳游戏策略,既可以提高分销商和制造商的利润,又可以提高其他区别元素。此外,在SR游戏中,当大多数退货根据制造商许可通过分销商进行再制造时,它不仅使会员的利润最大化,而且导致了区别要素的改进。但是,在Nash游戏中,成员之间存在关于再制造过程的冲突,与其他游戏相比,这降低了该游戏中的SC利润。 (C)2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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