首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Two-stage Models For The Analysis Of Information Content Of Equity-selling Mechanisms Choices
【24h】

Two-stage Models For The Analysis Of Information Content Of Equity-selling Mechanisms Choices

机译:股权出售机制选择信息内容的两阶段模型

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Extant research offers mixed empirical results on if private placement firms are undervalued. [Hertzel, Michael G., and Smith, L. (1993), "Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately," J Finance 48, 459-485] suggest that private placements convey favorable information. On the other hand, [Hertzel, Michael G., Lemmon, M., Linck, J., and Rees, L. (2002), "Long-Run Performance following Private Placements of Equity," J Finance 57, 2595-2617] show that, similar to public offering firms, private placement firms experience significant negative long-run post-announcement stock price performance. This paper develops the two-stage estimation models to explore the information content of equity-selling mechanism. This paper uses estimated residuals from insider trading regressions (proxy for abnormal insider trades) to measure private information. The result shows that the probability of making private placements increases with abnormal insider purchases and decreases with abnormal insider sales. This suggests that, relative to the public offering firms, private placement firms are undervalued.
机译:现有研究提供了关于私募公司是否被低估的实证结果。 [Hertzel,Michael G.和Smith,L.(1993),“市场折扣和股东私下配售股票所获得的收益,” J Finance 48,459-485]认为私募可以传达有利的信息。另一方面,[Hertzel,Michael G.,Lemmon,M.,Linck,J.和Rees,L.(2002),“私人股权配售后的长期业绩”,J Finance 57,2595-2617 ]表示,与公开发行公司类似,私人发行公司的长期公告后股价表现也很差。本文建立了两阶段估计模型,以探讨股权出售机制的信息内容。本文使用内幕交易回归(异常内幕交易的代理)的估计残差来衡量私人信息。结果表明,私募配售的可能性随着内部人员的异常购买而增加,而由于内部人员的异常销售而降低。这表明,相对于公开发行公司,私募公司被低估了。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号