Discussant Comment on An Examination of the Effect of CEO Social Ties and CEO Reputation on Nonprofessional Investors' Say-on-Pay Judgments, by Steve Kaplan, Janet Samuels, Jeffrey Cohen

摘要

In conclusion, the article provides timely evidence on how CEO reputation and social ties between the CEO and the ECC impact nonprofessional investors' say-on-pay through perceptions of fairness. As more countries empower shareholders by means of say-on-pay, and considering that ECCs impound voter dissent into compensation design (Ferri and Maber 2013), the article extends the literature by examining a new determinant of CEO compensation. Albeit underspecified, the article's theoretical predictions flow naturally from theory, and the results are informative; however, I have cautioned that the article's conclusions should be considered in light of the imprecise operation-alizations. In sum, I believe the article will stimulate future research and insights into investors' say-on-pay judgment and decision-making processes.