Reasons or rationalizations: The role of principles in the moral dumbfounding paradigm

摘要

Abstract Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm‐based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm‐based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non‐significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open‐ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm‐based or norm‐based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm‐based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm‐based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm‐based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found.