Eye Movements in Strategic Choice

摘要

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level-k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2x2 symmetric games including dominance-solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk-dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffswhether or not the comparison is strategically informativewas strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level-k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. (c) 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.