首页> 外文期刊>Journal of banking & finance >Earnings management, market discounts and the performance of private equity placements
【24h】

Earnings management, market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

机译:盈余管理,市场折扣和私募配售的业绩

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using "aggressive" earnings management significantly underperform those using more "conservative" earnings management.
机译:私募股权配售数据使我们能够确定资深投资者是否可以揭示公司的真实价值。这可以通过将成熟的投资者定义为满足私募股权市场严格参与要求的投资者来完成。我们的结果表明,私募股权发行公司在宣布私募股权发行之前的一个季度中夸大了其收益,并且精明的投资者在购买私募发行公司的股票时不要求公平的折扣。我们还发现有证据表明,发行前收益管理的效果逆转是私人债券长期业绩的重要决定因素。结果进一步表明,使用“积极”收益管理的公司的发行后股票表现和运营绩效明显低于那些使用“更保守”收益管理的公司。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号