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Information asymmetry and credit rating: A quasi-natural experiment from China

机译:信息不对称和信用评级:来自中国的准自然实验

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We examine how the issuer paid incumbent credit rating agencies (CRAs) in China adjust their rating strategies in response to the 2010 entry of an independent credit rating agency, China Bond Rating (CBR) between 2006 and 2015. The business model that CBR employs is a combination of the public utility model and the investor-paid model. We find that the CBR's ratings coverage effectively reduced the information asymmetry in the Chinese corporate bond market. The evidence shows decreased ratings inflation and increased informativeness of rating change announcements by incumbent issuer-paid CRAs after CBR entered the market. The findings suggest that a firm's credibility is an important channel driving issuerpaid incumbent CRAs' strategic ratings. Our paper provides new information and insight into the debate of whether CRAs with alternative business models can alleviate the information asymmetry problem. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们研究了发行人在中国的付费信用评级机构(CRA)如何调整其评级策略,以响应2006年至2015年间独立信用评级机构China Bond Rating(CBR)在2010年的加入。CBR采用的商业模式是公共事业模型和投资者付费模型的结合。我们发现,CBR的评级覆盖范围有效地降低了中国公司债券市场的信息不对称性。有证据表明,在CBR进入市场后,由发行人支付的CRA降低了评级通胀和评级变化公告的信息性。调查结果表明,公司的信誉是推动发行人支付在职CRA的战略评级的重要渠道。本文提供了新的信息,并深入探讨了具有替代业务模型的CRA是否可以缓解信息不对称问题的争论。 (C)2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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