AVIATION LAW—LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION—SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN OCCURRENCE AMOUNTS TO AN 'ACCIDENT' REQUIRES A SPECIFIC, FACTUAL INQUIRY: MAGAN V. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES

摘要

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides for an air carrier's liability to passengers who are injured by an "accident" while in flight. The Warsaw Convention, however, never defines the word "accident." In Air France v. Saks, the United States Supreme Court defined "accident" to mean "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger." Although Saks gave meaning to the word "accident," "courts continued to struggle with its meaning in particular cases." In the recent case of Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the Second Circuit ruled on the issue, holding that the determination of whether a particular incidence of turbulence amounts to an "accident" requires a case-by-case factual inquiry. By overruling the district court's institution of a bright-line rule, the Second Circuit's holding in Magan: 1) helps to provide international passengers with the means for fair recovery; 2) maintains the apportionment of risk of liability for passenger injury set forth by the Montreal Agreement; and 3) furthers the Warsaw Convention's goal of harmonizing air laws across borders.