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An exploratory study of earnings management detectability, analyst coverage and the impact of IFRS adoption: Evidence from China

机译:盈余管理可检测性,分析师范围以及采用IFRS的影响的探索性研究:来自中国的证据

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摘要

Analysts serving as external monitors to managers is a topic of considerable interest in the analyst coverage literature. There are two outcomes of analyst coverage studies: curbing and stimulating earnings management. However, recent studies (such as Yu, 2008) only provide evidence supporting the curbing side. Given the fact that the data of these studies focus on developed markets and the finding of Rodriguez-Perez and Hemmen (2010) that external governance mechanisms may stimulate earnings management in an opaque information environment, we conjecture whether stimulating side would be dominant in emerging markets. China offers a valuable setting for us to test the question. Using the data of China capital market from 2003 to 2009, we find that analyst coverage stimulates earnings management through above-the-line items (ALIs) where earnings management cannot be easily detected, and curbs earnings management through below-the-line items (BLIs) where earnings management can be easily detected. We also find that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China does create many new opportunities for managers' earnings management but does not significantly improve the monitoring effect of analyst coverage. We only find that compared to those without analyst coverage, firms with analyst coverage have a lower level of earnings management through BLIs after IFRS adoption. These findings suggest that information opacity may weaken the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms and high quality accounting standards in the literal sense may not enhance the monitoring effect of external corporate governance mechanisms if it is not compatible with the market's institutional environment. In addition, we find that firms with earnings meeting the benchmark have a lower level of earnings management, which indicates that bright-line accounting based rules used in emerging capital markets may constrain the managers' behavior.
机译:在管理人员研究范围内,作为管理人员的外部监督人员的分析人员非常感兴趣。分析师覆盖率研究有两个结果:遏制和刺激盈余管理。但是,最近的研究(例如Yu,2008年)仅提供了支持遏制方面的证据。鉴于这些研究的数据集中在发达市场上,并且Rodriguez-Perez和Hemmen(2010)发现外部治理机制可能会在不透明的信息环境中刺激盈余管理,因此我们推测在新兴市场中刺激因素是否会占主导地位。中国为我们检验这一问题提供了宝贵的环境。使用2003年至2009年中国资本市场的数据,我们发现分析师覆盖率可以通过无法轻易检测到盈余管理的“线上项目”(ALIs)来刺激盈余管理,而通过“线下项目”来抑制盈余管理( BLIs),可以轻松检测到收入管理。我们还发现,在中国采用国际财务报告准则(IFRS)确实为经理的盈余管理创造了许多新机会,但并没有显着改善分析师覆盖率的监测效果。我们仅发现,与没有分析师覆盖的公司相比,具有分析师覆盖的公司通过IFRS后通过BLI进行收益管理的水平较低。这些发现表明,信息不透明可能削弱外部公司治理机制的监督效果,而从字面上看,高质量的会计准则如果与市场的制度环境不兼容,则可能不会增强外部公司治理机制的监督效果。此外,我们发现收益达到基准的公司的收益管理水平较低,这表明在新兴资本市场中使用基于明晰会计准则的规则可能会限制经理的行为。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of accounting and public policy》 |2014年第4期|356-371|共16页
  • 作者单位

    College of International Finance and Commerce, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai 200083, People's Republic of China;

    School of Accountancy/Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, People's Republic of China;

    Leventhal School of Accounting, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441, USA;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:15:54

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