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Institutional Stock Ownership, Accrual Management, and Information Environment

机译:机构持股,应计管理和信息环境

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This study examines the empirical relationship between institutional percentage shareholding and accounting discretion exercised by firms to manage accruals over a period of time. It also evaluates the effects of firm size and information environment on such relationship. By employing a firm-specific abnormal accrual estimation design to measure accounting flexibility/discretion used to adjust abnormal accruals in financial reporting, the study documents that institutional stock ownership is inversely related to such accounting discretion exercised to manage abnormal current accruals. This inverse relationship is, however, found to be dependent on firm size and richness of information environment. Specifically, the inverse relationship strongly holds for smaller firms that are deemed to have an impoverished information environment compared with larger firms having information-rich environment. Furthermore, by using a two-stage least-squares approach, the study addresses the endogeneity-driven ambiguity which is inherent in the simple identification of a negative relation between institutional stock ownership and accrual management. The analysis demonstrates that the overall negative relationship is partly attributed to institutional shareholder monitoring that constrains management's ability to opportunistically manage abnormal accruals. The evidence is consistent with the view that active monitoring of institutional shareholders mitigates opportunistic reporting behavior of corporate managers and improves the quality of governance in the financial reporting process.
机译:这项研究考察了机构百分比股权与企业为管理应计费用在一段时间内行使的会计酌处权之间的经验关系。它还评估了企业规模和信息环境对这种关系的影响。通过采用特定于公司的异常应计估计设计来测量用于调整财务报告中异常应计的会计灵活性/减损,该研究证明机构股票所有权与管理异常当前应计所行使的这种会计判断力成反比。但是,发现这种反比关系取决于公司规模和信息环境的丰富程度。具体而言,与具有丰富信息环境的大型公司相比,逆关系在认为信息环境贫困的小型公司中尤为重要。此外,通过使用两阶段最小二乘法,该研究解决了内生性驱动的歧义,这种歧义是简单识别机构股票所有权和权责发生制管理之间的负相关关系所固有的。分析表明,总体负相关关系部分归因于机构股东监督,从而限制了管理层机会性管理异常应计项目的能力。证据与以下观点一致:积极监控机构股东可以减轻公司经理人的机会主义举报行为,并改善财务报告过程中的治理质量。

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