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The distraction effect of non-audit services on audit quality

机译:非审计服务对审计质量的分心效应

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The effect of auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) on audit quality has been a long-standing debate among academics, practitioners, and regulators. Academic research on this topic primarily examines client-level data to evaluate the tradeoff between independence and knowledge spillover related to providing NAS to a particular client.1 However, prior studies have not examined whether an emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients more generally (i.e., not just to a specific client) can distract auditors from providing high-quality audits. This ?distraction effect? can occur by diverting resources away from the audit function and toward other lines of business (Harris, 2014; 2015; PCAOB, 2015; Bloomberg, 2018). Distraction is distinct from independence because distraction represents a business decision, emphasizing providing NAS to audit clients. In contrast, independence is a client-specific issue related to the auditor's economic bond with that specific client (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981). We investigate this possible distraction effect by examining whether clients of audit offices that emphasize providing NAS receive lower audit quality. We motivate this study by regulator concerns that the promotion of NAS could distract audit firms from providing auditRegulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.0 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:审计员提供的非审计服务(NAS)对审计质量的影响是学者,从业者和监管机构之间的长期争论。关于本主题的学术研究主要审查了客户级数据,以评估与特定客户提供NAS的独立和知识溢出之间的权衡。然而,先前的研究没有检查是否重视提供NAS审核客户(即不仅仅是特定的客户)可以分散审计师提供高质量审核。这?分心效果吗?可以通过将资源转移远离审计职能以及其他行业(Harris,2014; 2015; PCAob,2015; Bloomberg,2018)。分心与独立不同,因为分心代表了一个经营决定,强调为审计客户提供NAS。相比之下,独立性是与审计师的经济债券与该特定客户有关的客户特定问题(例如,Deangelo,1981)。我们通过检查强调提供NAS的审计办公室的客户是否获得较低的审计质量,调查这种可能的分心效果。我们通过监管机构促进NAS的担忧来激发审计公司提供审计公司的促进,表达了审计公司的担忧,即强调非审计服务(NAS)可以分散审计函数,即使对于具有最小NAS购买的客户,也可以分散审计职能。通过这种担忧,我们研究了是否更加重视向审计客户提供NAS(即,不对特定客户)可以分散审计函数,从而降低审计质量。我们发现证据表明NAS分散效应,在审计办公室级别的强调NAS,即使在控制客户专用NAS之后,也在更多客户财务报表重述。此外,该关联存在于购买最小NAS的客户之间,这表明这种关联除了在先前研究中检测的独立问题之外还涉及分散效应。本研究应该对审计公司,审计委员会和监管机构感兴趣,因为它提供了有关与商业模式有关的问题的新证据,包括审计和非审计服务.0 2020 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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