...
首页> 外文期刊>International review of economics & finance >The relationship of G-Index and convertible debt issuance in the presence of restrictive covenants
【24h】

The relationship of G-Index and convertible debt issuance in the presence of restrictive covenants

机译:G-Index和可转换债务发行在限制契约中的关系

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       

摘要

We examine the relationship between the Governance Index (G-Index) and convertible bond use by firms, specifically in the presence or absence of covenants. We find that the better the share-holder governance (lower G-Index) of firms, the more they are likely to issue convertible instead of straight bonds. More importantly, we find that the complementary relationship between share-holder governance and convertible bond use is driven by the existence of certain covenants attached to these convertible securities. We also find that this effect is accentuated in firms with smaller size, higher market-to-book, R&D and intangibles as well as higher beta. We conclude that this link between strong shareholder rights and increased convertible bond use is conditional on the presence of covenants and therefore shows the important interaction of these three governance mechanisms. In addition, this triple link being emphasized in firms with higher agency costs and adverse selection problems is consistent with value-maximizing use of convertible bonds.
机译:我们审查了公司治理指数(G-INDEX)与公司的可转换债券之间的关系,特别是在契约中的存在或缺失。我们发现公司的股东治理(较低的G-Index)更好,越多,可能发出可兑换而不是直接债券。更重要的是,我们发现股东治理和可转换债券之间的互补关系是由附属于这些可换股证券的某些契约的存在驱动的。我们还发现,这种效果在具有较小规模,更高的市场到书籍,研发和无形资产以及更高的β的公司中强调。我们得出结论,强劲股东权益与可转换债券使用之间的联系是有条件的关于契约的存在,因此表明这三项治理机制的重要互动。此外,在具有较高机构成本和不利选择问题的公司中强调这种三重链路与可转换债券的价值最大限度地利用相一致。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号