Anti-collusive self-healing key distributions for wireless networks

摘要

We introduce three efficient anti-collusive self-healing key distribution schemes with t-revocation capability. Our proposed key distribution mechanism uses one-way hash chain. We obtain reduced storage, communication and computation costs over the previous approaches, which make our designs scalable to very large groups in highly mobile, volatile and hostile wireless networks. Our schemes are properly analysed in an appropriate security model and are proven to be computationally secure and achieve both forward and backward secrecy. Also our schemes can resist collusion between the newly joint users and the revoked users. Our set-up allows each user to choose its joining session at its will, whereas the session for user's revocation is pre-selected by the group manager. Unlike the existing self-healing key distribution schemes, rejoining of revoked users is permitted in our schemes at a later session with new identities. These features facilitate the group manager no longer to execute expensive traitor tracing mechanisms to keep track of individual compromised users.