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Committed or contingent? The retailer's information acquisition and sharing strategies when confronting manufacturer encroachment

机译:承诺或偶然? 零售商在面对制造商侵犯时的信息收购和分享策略

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Unlike most studies focusing on the manufacturer's channel strategy, we investigate how a retailer strategically acquires and shares consumer quality preference information when confronting manufacturer encroachment. As a follower, the manufacturer decides the quality level and sales quantity based on the information he holds. Considering the retailer's flexibility in acquisition timing, we focus on two formats, namely committed acquisition and contingent acquisition, depending on whether the retailer commits to her acquisition decision before or after the manufacturer's quality investment. Assuming the manufacturer provides identical product through different selling channels, we find that when the manufacturer's direct selling efficiency is high, contingent acquisition is always a weakly dominant strategy, while the retailer is suggested to commit to acquire information if and only if the direct selling efficiency is low and the acquisition cost is relatively high. If the consumer quality preference is acquired, information sharing occurs only when the direct selling efficiency is sufficiently high, via which the retailer can induce a lower expected wholesale price, gain a higher market share, and achieve a "win-win" situation. With the information advantage, the retailer can always obtain a positive profit in the distribution channel, while the inefficient manufacturer may stop selling in the direct channel when consumers have a low preference for quality. Our result explains why, despite manufacturers directly obtain profits from their own channels, they still sell products through retail channels and even treat them as main distributive ways. Based on the above equilibrium outcomes, we derive the retailer's optimal strategy for information management, whereby the retailer can not only induce the highest product quality, but also the highest consumer surplus as compared to other acquisition strategies. Our work can guide retailers to better implement information strategies when confronting manufacturer encroachment.
机译:与专注于制造商的渠道战略的大多数研究不同,我们调查零售商如何在面对制造商侵犯时策略性地获取和共享消费质量偏好信息。作为追随者,制造商根据他持有的信息决定质量水平和销售量。考虑到零售商在收购时机的灵活性,我们专注于两种格式,即犯下收购和或有目的的收购,具体取决于零售商在制造商质量投资之前或之后的收购决定。假设制造商通过不同的销售渠道提供相同的产品,我们发现,当制造商的直接销售效率很高时,或有收购始终是一个弱优势的策略,而零售商则建议才能提交信息,只有在直接销售效率低,收购成本相对较高。如果获得消费者质量偏好,只有当直接销售效率足够高时,才会发生信息共享,通过该零售商可以诱导较低的预期批发价格,获得更高的市场份额,实现“双赢”情况。通过信息优势,零售商可以始终在分销渠道中获得积极的利润,而效率低下的制造商可能会在消费者对质量的低偏好时停止在直接渠道中销售。我们的结果解释了为什么制造商直接从自己的渠道获取利润,他们仍然通过零售渠道销售产品,甚至将它们视为主要分配方式。基于上述均衡结果,我们推出了零售商的信息管理的最佳策略,由此零售商不仅可以诱导最高的产品质量,而且与其他收购策略相比,消费者盈余也是最高的。我们的工作可以指导零售商在面对制造商侵犯时更好地实施信息策略。

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