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How to protect specific investments from opportunism: A moderated mediation model of customer integration and transformational leadership

机译:如何保护机会主义的特定投资:客户集成和转型领导的审核调解模式

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摘要

Manufacturers usually deploy specific investments to their customers in order to foster cooperation between them. However, manufacturers that implement specific investments are likely to incur potential opportunism from their customers. In this way, manufacturers need to protect their specific investments and curb customer's opportunism. Based on transaction cost economics, this study develops a moderated mediation model that includes customer integration, as a mediator between manufacturer's specific investments and customer's opportunism, and transformational leadership, as a moderator on the relationship between the mediator and customer's opportunism. To test the model, we collected data from 206 Chinese manufacturers. The results show first, manufacturer's specific investments have a positive direct effect, but a negative indirect effect through customer integration, on customer's opportunism. Second, transformational leadership strengthens the negative effect of customer integration on customer's opportunism. Third, transformational leadership enhances the negative indirect effect of manufacturer's specific investments on customer's opportunism. This study contributes to governance mechanism literature by employing customer integration as an effective governance mechanism and contributes to leadership literature by building a transformational leadership-governance mechanism link, involving transformational leadership to the area of operations management. Our findings also provide insightful guidelines for manufacturers to protect specific investments, thus solving the conflict in investing for benefits and opportunism.
机译:制造商通常向客户部署特定投资,以促进他们之间的合作。然而,实施特定投资的制造商可能会对客户产生潜在的机会主义。通过这种方式,制造商需要保护他们的具体投资和遏制客户的机会主义。该研究基于交易成本经济学,开发了一个次要的调解模型,包括客户整合,作为制造商的具体投资和客户机会主义和转型领导之间的调解员,作为一个主持人与调解员和客户机会主义之间的关系。要测试模型,我们从206家中国制造商收集数据。结果表明,制造商的特定投资具有积极的直接效果,而是通过客户集成,对客户的机会主义进行负面的间接效果。其次,转型领导层加强了客户整合对客户机会主义的负面影响。第三,转型领导层增强了制造商对客户机会主义的特定投资的负面间接影响。这项研究通过将客户整合作为一种有效的治理机制,为治理机制文献做出有助于通过构建转型领导能力的联系,促进了转型领导地位,促进了转型领导地位。我们的调查结果还为制造商提供了保护特定投资的洞察准则,从而解决投资福利和机会主义的冲突。

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