Numerous books have been written on the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the failure of both Israeli and U.S. intelligence to anticipate that conflict. Their titles hint at their content: Dado-48 Years and 20 More Days; The Watchmen Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources; and Neila and the Story of the Surprise Attack in Yom-Kippur War, among many others.1 But for the past 45 years the feeling has always been strong that not all has been reviewed about the circumstances that led to that near disaster since Israel's leaders are now known to have had a lot of military intelligence about the coming conflict. Yet they still made critical, operative decisions before the war started that were terribly wrong, and the vast literature published has not yet provided a full and reliable answer for their wrong options.
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