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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Emerging Markets >Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa: Examining the moderating role of political institutions
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Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa: Examining the moderating role of political institutions

机译:非洲中央银行的独立性,选举和财政政策:审查政治机构的调节作用

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality.Design/methodology/approach Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970-2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries.Findings The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI's effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries.Practical implications The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years.Originality/value The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain government spending. It also compares findings in Africa to other developing countries, noting some differences.
机译:目的本文的目的是主要调查独立中央银行(中央银行独立(CBI))改善非洲财政绩效的能力(包括选举年),并研究CBI在改善财政绩效方面的有效性是否达到预期水平。设计/方法论/方法利用Garriga(2016)在1970-2012年期间针对48个非洲国家,90个其他发展中国家和40个发达国家的CBI最新数据,作者采用了两阶段系统GMM Windmeijer(2005)的小样本稳健校正估计量,用于检验CBI和选举对非洲,其他发展中国家和发达国家的财政政策的影响。作者提供的证据表明,与其他发展中国家和发达国家不同,CBI并未显着改善非洲的财政绩效。然而,更高水平的机构质量提高了CBI在改善非洲财政绩效方面的有效性。尽管选举直接恶化了非洲的财政绩效,但机构质量提高了CBI在非洲,其他发展中国家和发达国家的选举年中改善财政绩效的影响。原创性/价值该研究是CBI-财政政策联系的研究中的第一项,该研究使用中央银行对政府的净债权占GDP的百分比来衡量财政政策。 。除了使用财政平衡之外,本研究还使用周期性调整的财政平衡作为衡量财政政策的手段。这是独立中央银行限制政府支出的关键渠道。它还比较了非洲与其他发展中国家的发现,并指出了一些差异。

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