EV-C2C-PAKE: An improved client-to-client password-authenticated key exchange protocol

摘要

With rapid changes in the modern communication environment such as ad hoc networks and ubiquitous computing, it is necessary to construct a secure end-to-end channel between clients. In the last few years, researchers have extensively studied the password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting. The fundamental security goal of PAKE is security against dictionary attacks. The protocols for verifier-based PAKE are additionally required to be secure against server compromise. In this paper we propose an efficient verifier-based C2C-PAKE (called EV-C2C-PAKE) protocol resilient to server compromise. The new protocol resists dictionary attacks mounted by either passive or active network intruders, allowing, in principle, even weak password phrases to be used safely. It also offers perfect forward secrecy, which protects past sessions and passwords against future compromises. Finally, user passwords are stored in a form that is not plaintext-equivalent to the password itself, so an attacker who captures the password database cannot use it directly to compromise security and gain immediate access to the host. Furthermore, the authentication server can't get any information for the session key between the two users and the mutual authentication will carry through between the server and the two users.