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Bilateral investment treaties and backward linkages in Sub-Saharan Africa

机译:撒哈拉以南非洲的双边投资条约和落后联系

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This article is an original contribution to the understanding of the impact of bilateral investment treaties in developing countries. By exploiting a unique sample of foreign affiliates in nineteen Sub-Saharan Africa countries, we show that the presence of a bilateral investment treaty between FDI origin and destination countries is positively related to the propensity of foreign investors to generate linkages to local suppliers. In addition, we find evidence that such relationship is stronger for countries with lower institutional quality and that bilateral investment treaties become more effective the larger the difference in levels of development between source and host. The estimation technique we use is a two-limit Tobit model. Our results are of high importance from a political point of view. They support the argument that bilateral investment treaties can help countries with low levels of governance quality, as several Sub-Saharan African countries, to credibly remedy local institutional inefficiencies and, therefore, the participation in an international treaty make the opportunities for local sourcing more likely. These potential gains can justify the decision of policymakers in developing countries to sign BITs, despite such agreements impinging on their national sovereignty.
机译:本文是对理解发展中国家双边投资条约的影响的原始贡献。通过利用19个撒哈拉以南非洲国家的独特外汇公司样本,我们认为,外国直接投资起源和目的地国家之间的双边投资条约的存在与外国投资者的倾向产生了与当地供应商的联系的倾向。此外,我们发现有证据表明,制度质量较低的国家,这种关系更强,双边投资条约变得更加有效,源头和主持人之间的发展水平差异越大。我们使用的估计技术是两个限制的TOBBIT模型。我们的结果是政治观点高度重要的。他们支持双边投资条约可以帮助各国治理质量水平低,作为几个撒哈拉以南非洲国家,可靠地纠正当地的机构效率低下,因此,参加国际条约的参与使当地采购的机会更有可能。尽管这些协议抵抗其国家主权,但这些潜在的收益可以证明政策制定者在发展中国家的决定是为了签署比赛。

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