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摘要

Most of the great asset managers I know-espe-cially among hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds-tend to think of alignment of interests with limited partners as little more than the provision of eye-popping investment returns. In fact, many general partners invoke the returns they've delivered to universities, firefighters, teachers and police officers in justifying their business models and approach to fund relationships. But while we'd all agree that the prospect of delivering high returns to middle-class workers is exciting, it's not alignment. I'd argue that establishing and negotiating a fund relationship on the basis of historical returns actually distorts incentives and misaligns interests between GP and LP. Let me explain. My baseline expectation, which I draw from empirical research, is that amazing managers that do actually create persistent value tend to capture the lion's share of that value. Add to that the fact that past performance is not a reliable predictor of future returns, and LPs that agree to bad terms on the basis of past performance are undeniably putting themselves in a dangerous situation. Go ask that god of venture capital how his clean-tech bets played out. Or that hedge fund legend how his gold bet fared. The reality is this: Great fund managers aren't great forever. So even when you're dealing with the best managers in the world, alignment matters.
机译:我所认识的大多数伟大资产管理者,尤其是对冲基金,私募股权基金和风险投资基金中的大多数,都倾向于认为与有限合伙人进行利益调整只不过是提供令人eye目的投资回报。实际上,许多普通合伙人会利用他们提供给大学,消防员,教师和警察的回报来证明其商业模式和建立关系的方法的合理性。但是,尽管我们都同意向中产阶级工人提供高回报的前景令人兴奋,但这并不是一致的。我认为,基于历史收益建立和协商基金关系实际上会扭曲激励机制,并使GP和LP之间的利益失衡。让我解释。我从经验研究中得出的基线期望是,确实创造持久价值的出色管理者往往会抓住该价值的绝大部分。除此之外,过去的表现不能可靠地预测未来的回报,并且基于过去的表现同意不良条件的有限合伙人无疑将自己置于危险境地。去问问那个风险投资之神,他的清洁技术赌注是如何发挥作用的。或是那个对冲基金的传奇人物,他的黄金下注如何发展。现实是这样的:优秀的基金经理并非永远都是伟大的。因此,即使您要与世界上最好的经理打交道,协调也很重要。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Institutional investor》 |2016年第1期|54-54|共1页
  • 作者

    Ashby Monk;

  • 作者单位

    Global Projects Center at Stanford University;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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