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Reports Analyze Effect Of Profit Policy On Defense Contracts

机译:报告分析利润政策对国防合同的影响

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Contracts with incentive-fee or award-fee provisions generally experience less cost growth than contracts without such provisions, but this does not imply that greater use of these contracts by the Defense Department would produce better contract outcomes, according to a Pentagon study.rnThe February report, titled "Can Profit Policy & Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?" states DOD cannot simply force contractors to take on the greater risk of a contract with incentive features.rnThe Pentagon's industrial policy shop issued the report along with a second study titled "Defense Department Profit and Contract Finance Policies and Their Effects on Contract and Contractor Performance." Both were conducted for DOD by the Institute for Defense Analyses.rn"Contracts are negotiated, and the degree of risk is not just a matter of provisions on fee; target cost also matters, and a contractor presumably would seek to offset the risk introduced by negotiating a higher target cost," the first report states. "The net result could be a contract that experiences less cost growth but with a cost to the Defense Department that is the same or even greater."
机译:五角大楼的一项研究表明,具有激励费或奖励费条款的合同通常比没有此类条款的合同的成本增长要慢,但这并不意味着国防部对这些合同的更多使用将产生更好的合同结果。报告,题为“利润政策和合同激励可以改善国防合同结果吗?”各州国防部不能简单地强迫承包商承担具有激励特征的合同的更大风险。五角大楼的工业政策研究室发布了该报告以及名为“国防部利润和合同融资政策及其对合同和承包商绩效的影响”的第二项研究。 ”两者都是由国防部分析研究所为国防部进行的。“谈判的是合同,风险的程度不仅仅是费用规定的问题;目标成本也很重要,承包商大概会寻求抵消由国防部引入的风险。商讨更高的目标成本。”第一份报告指出。 “最终结果可能是合同的成本增长较少,但国防部的成本却相同甚至更高。”

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