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Deriving ChaCha20 key streams from targeted memory analysis

机译:从目标内存分析中得出ChaCha20密钥流

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摘要

There can be performance and vulnerability concerns with block ciphers, thus stream ciphers can used as an alternative. Although many symmetric key stream ciphers are fairly resistant to side-channel attacks, cryptographic artefacts may exist in memory. This paper identifies a significant vulnerability within OpenSSH and OpenSSL and which involves the discovery of cryptographic artefacts used within the ChaCha20 cipher. This can allow for the cracking of tunneled data using a single targeted memory extraction. With this, law enforcement agencies and/or malicious agents could use the vulnerability to take copies of the encryption keys used for each tunnelled connection. The user of a virtual machine would not be alerted to the capturing of the encryption key, as the method runs from an extraction of the running memory. Methods of mitigation include making cryptographic artefacts difficult to discover and limiting memory access. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:分组密码可能存在性能和漏洞方面的顾虑,因此可以将流密码用作替代方法。尽管许多对称密钥流密码相当有效地抵抗了旁信道攻击,但内存中可能存在加密伪像。本文确定了OpenSSH和OpenSSL中的一个重大漏洞,其中涉及ChaCha20密码中使用的加密伪像的发现。这可以允许使用单个目标内存提取来破坏隧道数据。这样,执法机构和/或恶意代理可以利用此漏洞获取用于每个隧道连接的加密密钥的副本。由于该方法从运行内存的提取中运行,因此不会警告虚拟机用户捕获加密密钥。缓解方法包括使密码伪像难以发现和限制内存访问。 (C)2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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