Crowdsourcing Model for Energy Efficiency Retrofit and Mixed-Integer Equilibrium Analysis

摘要

Most existing models of energy efficiency retrofit are able to evaluate energy saving and retrofit cost for a certain stakeholder, but unable to guide how to allocate retrofit task and incentive among multiple stakeholders. The multistakeholder situation is firstly modeled in the proposed crowdsourcing model (CM), which contributes to quantify the utility of each competitive stakeholder with respect to participation decision. To solve the CM, a Stackelberg game approach is newly developed in this article to find rational and efficient strategies of task/incentive allocation. For the building energy efficiency retrofit, the challenge of CM is to handle mixed-integer decisions of energy service companies. We prove the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), which introduces the optimal budget, and the Nash equilibrium of task allocation. To compute the SE of CM, effective search algorithms are designed based on best response and optimization techniques. Simulation results have verified the CM and game theoretical approach. The resulted SE has provided stable and efficient strategies of incentive/task allocation.