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Securing Provenance of Distributed Processes in an Untrusted Environment

机译:在不受信任的环境中确保分布式过程的来源

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Recently, there is much concern about the provenance of distributed processes, that is about the documentation of the origin and the processes to produce an object in a distributed system. The provenance has many applications in the forms of medical records, documentation of processes in the computer systems, recording the origin of data in the cloud, and also documentation of human-executed processes. The provenance of distributed processes can be modeled by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where each node represents an entity, and an edge represents the origin and causal relationship between entities. Without sufficient security mechanisms, the provenance graph suffers from integrity and confidentiality problems, for example changes or deletions of the correct nodes, additions of fake nodes and edges, and unauthorized accesses to the sensitive nodes and edges. In this paper, we propose an integrity mechanism for provenance graph using the digital signature involving three parties: the process executors who are responsible in the nodes' creation, a provenance owner that records the nodes to the provenance store, and a trusted party that we call the Trusted Counter Server (TCS) that records the number of nodes stored by the provenance owner. We show that the mechanism can detect the integrity problem in the provenance graph, namely unauthorized and malicious "authorized" updates even if all the parties, except the TCS, collude to update the provenance. In this scheme, the TCS only needs a very minimal storage (linear with the number of the provenance owners). To protect the confidentiality and for an efficient access control administration, we propose a method to encrypt the provenance graph that allows access by paths and compartments in the provenance graph. We argue that encryption is important as a mechanism to protect the provenance data stored in an untrusted environment. We analyze the security of the integrity mechanism, and perform experiments to measure the performance of both mechanisms.
机译:最近,人们非常关注分布式过程的来源,即有关起源的文档以及在分布式系统中生成对象的过程的文档。该资源以医疗记录,计算机系统中的过程的文档记录,在云中记录数据的来源以及人类执行的过程的文档的形式具有许多应用。分布式过程的来源可以通过有向无环图(DAG)建模,其中每个节点代表一个实体,一条边代表实体之间的起源和因果关系。如果没有足够的安全机制,则源图将遭受完整性和机密性问题,例如正确节点的更改或删除,伪节点和边缘的添加以及对敏感节点和边缘的未授权访问。在本文中,我们提出了一种使用数字签名的物产图完整性机制,涉及三个方面:负责节点创建的流程执行者,将节点记录到物产存储中的物产所有者以及我们信任的一方呼叫可信任计数器服务器(TCS),该服务器记录由源所有者存储的节点数。我们展示了该机制可以检测出源图中的完整性问题,即未经授权和恶意的“授权”更新,即使除TCS之外的所有各方合谋更新了源。在这种方案中,TCS仅需要一个非常小的存储空间(与出处所有者的数量成线性关系)。为了保护机密性并进行有效的访问控制管理,我们提出了一种加密出处图的方法,该方法允许通过出处图中的路径和隔离专区进行访问。我们认为加密作为保护存储在不受信任的环境中的来源数据的机制非常重要。我们分析完整性机制的安全性,并进行实验以衡量这两种机制的性能。

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