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Analysis of Price Changes in Artificial Double Auction Markets Consisting of Multi-Agents Using Genetic Programming for Learning and Its Applications

机译:遗传编程学习在多代理商人工双拍卖市场价格变化中的应用及其应用

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摘要

In this paper, we show the analysis of price changes in artificial double auction markets consisting of multi-agents who learn from past experiences based on the Genetic Programming (GP) and its applications. For simplicity, we focus on the double auction in an electricity market. Agents in the market are allowed to buy or sell items (electricity) depending on the prediction of situations. Each agent has a pool of individuals (decision functions) represented in tree structures to decide bid price by using the past result of auctions. A fitness of each individual is defined by using successful bids and a capacity utilization rate of production units for a production of items, and agents improve their individuals based on the GP to get higher return in coming auctions. In simulation studies, changes of bid prices and returns of bidders are discussed depending on demand curves of customers and the weight between an average profit obtained by successful bids and the capacity utilization rate of production units. The validation of simulation studies is examined by comparing results with classical models and price changes in real double auction markets. Since bid prices bear relatively large changes, we apply an approximate method for a control by forcing agents stabilize the changes in bid prices. As a result, we see the stabilization scheme of bid prices in double auction markets is not realistic, then it is concluded that the market contains substantial instability.
机译:在本文中,我们展示了由双重代理人组成的人工双拍卖市场中价格变化的分析,这些代理人基于遗传规划(GP)及其应用从过去的经验中学习。为简单起见,我们专注于电力市场中的双重拍卖。市场上的代理商可以根据情况的预测来买卖物品(电力)。每个代理商都有一个以树状结构表示的个人池(决策功能),以通过使用拍卖的过去结果来决定出价。每个人的适应性是通过使用成功的投标和产品生产的生产单位的产能利用率来定义的,代理商根据GP改进他们的个人以在即将进行的拍卖中获得更高的回报。在模拟研究中,根据客户的需求曲线以及中标者获得的平均利润与生产单位的产能利用率之间的权重,讨论了投标价格和投标人收益的变化。通过将结果与经典模型进行比较以及在实际的双重拍卖市场中的价格变化来检验模拟研究的有效性。由于投标价格变化较大,因此我们通过强迫代理商稳定投标价格的变化来采用近似控制方法。结果,我们认为双重拍卖市场中的投标价格稳定方案是不现实的,因此可以得出结论,该市场存在很大的不稳定性。

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