THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TAXI MARKET REGULATION WITH A FOCUS ON THE CASE STUDY OF BANGKOK

摘要

The operation of the taxi market and the effects of regulation are discussed based on theoretical analysis and a case study of Bangkok, where taxi fares were not regulated, prior to April 1992, in respect of the level of fares nor the basis on which fares were to be calculated.' Since waiting time is the most important element of user cost after the fare, the taxi market and regulation policy must be analyzed in terms of the availability, which is the ratio of the amount of demand to the amount of supply. The Bangkok case study concluded that fare competition was taking place at least locally, and had the effect of keeping fares low at nearly full cost and operation efficiency high. Entry regulation in Bangkok was judged to be producing market conditions advantageous to suppliers because, although fares were high due to the high rate of loaded trips, availability was low, and the amount of demand was small. The imposition of uniform fares causes problems of economic loss, biased service allocation, and unreasonable cross-subsidization, which were avoided by Bangkok's system of negotiated fares. This is due to the fact that average cost differs with the amount of demand, which varies with the demand density of the area served. Management form of taxi operation is also discussed in relation to the existence of scale economies and other ele-ments.