Nuclear Fuel Cycle Which Way Forward For Multilateral Approaches?

摘要

For several years now, the debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been dominated by individuals and countries that violate rules of good behaviour - as sellers or acquirers of clandestine nuclear technology. As a result, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been declared to be "inadequate" by some, "full of loopholes" by others. Two basic approaches have been put forward to tighten up the NPT; both seek to ensure that the nuclear non-proliferation regime maintains its authority and credibility in the face of these very real challenges. One calls for non-nuclear weapon States to accept a partial denial of technology through a reinterpreta-tion of the NPT's provisions governing the rights of access to nuclear technologies. The unwillingness of most non-nuclear-weapon States to accept additional restrictions under the NPT makes this approach difficult. The other approach would apply multinational alternatives to the national operation ofuranium-cnrichment and plutonium-separation technologies, and to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel.